### 1NC - Moloch

#### Gustave Flaubert is most known for ‘Madam Bovary,” the famously boring account of a woman much like Paris Hilton, but he also explored a darker, more primordial and fundamentally terrifying literary subject: The ancient God Moloch, the God of security who offered immediate control of the world in exchange for the lives of humans. Humans are metamorphosed in the ritual of calculative sacrifice into oxen and eventually into sacrificial litter; turned into pure MOLK or sacrificial STOCK to save the rest. This is his account of the sacrifice:

(Gustave Flaubert, French novelist, “Salammbo,” Ch. 13)

The brazen arms were working more quickly. They paused no longer. Every time that a child was placed in them the priests of Moloch spread out their hands upon him to burden him with the crimes of the people, vociferating: "They are not men but oxen!" and the multitude round about repeated: "Oxen! oxen!" The devout exclaimed: "Lord! eat!" and the priests of formula: "Pour out rain! bring forth!" The victims, when scarcely at the edge of the opening, disappeared like a drop of water on a red-hot plate, and white smoke rose amid the great scarlet colour. Nevertheless, the appetite of the god was not appeased. He ever wished for more. In order to furnish him with a larger supply, the victims were piled up on his hands with a big chain above them which kept them in their place. Some devout persons had at the beginning wished to count them, to see whether their number corresponded with the days of the solar year; but others were brought, and it was impossible to distinguish them in the giddy motion of the horrible arms. This lasted for a long, indefinite time until the evening. Then the partitions inside assumed a darker glow, and burning flesh could be seen. Some even believed that they could descry hair, limbs, and whole bodies. Night fell; clouds accumulated above the Baal. The funeral-pile, which was flameless now, formed a pyramid of coals up to his knees; completely red like a giant covered with blood, he looked, with his head thrown back, as though he were staggering beneath the weight of his intoxication.

#### WE PRESENT THE AFFIRMATIVE AS MOLOCH, the great stone GOD of the Ammonites demanding SACRIFICE and TERROR in exchange for SECURITY and STASIS; they rise over our sites of worship, our debate rounds, our places of holy communion as an INAUTHENTIC and CORRUPTED form of divine interaction—one premised on violence, on fear, on a terrifying metaphysics of ANARCHY and eternal PAIN that we throw around as if that were all there was. They present an INDUSTRIAL METAPHYSICS which promises us PRODUCTION, POWER, AND GROWTH as we sacrifice our beloved JOY, ECSTASIES, our experiences with the world and in the world—they ask that we take up the banner of their God of Security, of Moloch, and in doing they consume the essence of Being.

From poet Allen Ginsberg in 1955 (Allen Ginsberg, poet, “Howl,” Part II, <http://www.wussu.com/poems/agh.htm>) CJQ

What sphinx of cement and aluminium bashed open their skulls and ate up their brains and imagination? Moloch! Solitude! Filth! Ugliness! Ashcans and unobtainable dollars! Children screaming under the stairways! Boys sobbing in armies! Old men weeping in the parks! Moloch! Moloch! Nightmare of Moloch! Moloch the loveless! Mental Moloch! Moloch the heavy judger of men! Moloch the incomprehensible prison! Moloch the crossbone soulless jailhouse and Congress of sorrows! Moloch whose buildings are judgement! Moloch the vast stone of war! Moloch the stunned governments! Moloch whose mind is pure machinery! Moloch whose blood is running money! Moloch whose fingers are ten armies! Moloch whose breast is a cannibal dynamo! Moloch whose ear is a smoking tomb! Moloch whose eyes are a thousand blind windows! Moloch whose skyscrapers stand in the long streets like endless Jehovas! Moloch whose factories dream and choke in the fog! Moloch whose smokestacks and antennae crown the cities! Moloch whose love is endless oil and stone! Moloch whose soul is electricity and banks! Moloch whose poverty is the specter of genius! Moloch whose fate is a cloud of sexless hydrogen! Moloch whose name is the Mind! Moloch in whom I sit lonely! Moloch in whom I dream angels! Crazy in Moloch! Cocksucker in Moloch! Lacklove and manless in Moloch! Moloch who entered my soul early! Moloch in whom I am a consciousness without a body! Moloch who frightened me out of my natural ecstasy! Moloch whom I abandon! Wake up in Moloch! Light streaming out of the sky! Moloch! Moloch! Robot apartments! invisable suburbs! skeleton treasuries! blind capitals! demonic industries! spectral nations! invincible madhouses! granite cocks! monstrous bombs! They broke their backs lifting Moloch to Heaven! Pavements, trees, radios, tons! lifting the city to Heaven which exists and is everywhere about us! Visions! omens! hallucinations! miracles! ecstacies! gone down the American river! Dreams! adorations! illuminations! religions! the whole boatload of sensitive bullshit! Breakthroughs! over the river! flips and crucifixions! gone down the flood! Highs! Epiphanies! Despairs! Ten years' animal screams and suicides! Minds! New loves! Mad generation! down on the rocks of Time! Real holy laughter in the river! They saw it all! the wild eyes! the holy yells! They bade farewell! They jumped off the roof! to solitude! waving! carrying flowers! Down to the river! into the street!

#### MODERN democratic politics remain suffused with Moloch’s profound industrial cynicism. But what’s found in the front of all catastrophes? What’s exposed in the essence of security? It’s humanity’s reduction of the world to standing units of calculation to DOMINATE, CONTROL and ORDER the world that arises from the metaphysical tradition exemplified by the West.

#### This calculation encloses on beings and makes it seem like there’s no escape—the profound industrial nausea sets in, and before you know it there’s no exit from the rising clouds of the pollution that were thrown into the air so you could have the methane to power your electricity. Metaphysics challenge-forth Dasein to consume Being in EVERY possible way, naturalizing the annihilation of Being. Nuclear war is the final pronouncement of this calculation: Extinction is inevitable in a world where technology has stripped the world of value; Ontology offers our only hope for escape

Caputo 1993 (John D., Prof. Religion and Humanities Villanova University, “Demythologizing Heidegger,” Pp. 136-141)

Thus the real destruction of the thing, the one that abolishes its most essential Being and Wesen, occurs when the scientific determination of things prevails and compels our assent. The thingliness of the jug is to serve as the place which gathers together the fruit of earth and sun in mortal offering to the gods above. But all that is destroyed when pouring this libation becomes instead the displacement of air by a liquid; at that moment science has succeeded in reducing the jug-thing to a non-entity (Nichtige). Science, or rather the dominion of scientific representation, the rule of science over what comes to presence, what is called the Wesen, which is at work in science and technology, that is the truly explosive-destructive thing, the more essential dis-placing. The gathering of earth and sky, mortals and gods, that holds sway in the thing for "gathering" is what the Old High German thing means is scattered to the four winds, and that more essential annihilation occurs even if the bomb never goes off: Science's knowledge, which is compelling within its own sphere, the sphere of objects, already had annihilated things long before the atom bomb exploded. The bomb's explosion is only the grossest of all gross confirmations of the long-since accomplished annihilation of the thing. (VA, 168/PLT, 170) When things have been annihilated in their thingness, the mushroom clouds of the bomb cannot be far behind. So whether or not the bomb goes off is not essential, does not penetrate to the essence of what comes to presence in the present age of technological proximities and reduced distances. What is essential is the loss of genuine nearness, authentic and true nearness, following which the actual physical annihilation of planetary life would be a "gross" confirmation, an unrefined, external, physical destruction that would be but a follow-up, another afterthought, a less subtle counterpart to a more inward, profound, essential, authentic, ontological destruction

#### Western ontologies of mastery and control try to impose a technological order on the international realm—this makes war and violence inevitable as military planners come to believe themselves neutral ministers of control—use this round as an opportunity to rethink this ontology.

Burke 2007 (Anthony, Asst. Prof International Relations and Politics at University of New South Wales, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence, and Reason,” Muse)

By itself, such an account of the nationalist ontology of war and security provides only a general insight into the perseverance of military violence as a core element of politics. It does not explain why so many policymakers think military violence works. As I argued earlier, such an ontology is married to a more rationalistic form of strategic thought that claims to link violent means to political ends predictably and controllably, and which, by doing so, combines military action and national purposes into a common -- and thoroughly modern -- horizon of certainty. Given Hegel's desire to decisively distil and control the dynamic potentials of modernity in thought, it is helpful to focus on the modernity of this ontology -- one that is modern in its adherence to modern scientific models of truth, reality and technological progress, and in its insistence on imposing images of scientific truth from the physical sciences (such as mathematics and physics) onto human behaviour, politics and society. For example, the military theorist and historian Martin van Creveld has argued that one of the reasons Clausewitz was so influential was that his 'ideas seemed to have chimed in with the rationalistic, scientific, and technological outlook associated with the industrial revolution'. Set into this epistemological matrix, modern politics and government engages in a sweeping project of mastery and control in which all of the world's resources -- mineral, animal, physical, human -- are made part of a machinic process of which war and violence are viewed as normal features. These are the deeper claims and implications of Clausewitzian strategic reason. One of the most revealing contemporary examples comes from the writings (and actions) of Henry Kissinger, a Harvard professor and later U.S. National Security Adviser and Secretary of State. He wrote during the Vietnam war that after 1945 U.S. foreign policy was based 'on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in emerging countries'. This 'scientific revolution' had 'for all practical purposes, removed technical limits from the exercise of power in foreign policy'. Kissinger's conviction was based not merely in his pride in the vast military and bureaucratic apparatus of the United States, but in a particular epistemology (theory of knowledge). Kissinger asserted that the West is 'deeply committed to the notion that the real world is external to the observer, that knowledge consists of recording and classifying data -- the more accurately the better'. This, he claimed, has since the Renaissance set the West apart from an 'undeveloped' world that contains 'cultures that have escaped the early impact of Newtonian thinking' and remain wedded to the 'essentially pre-Newtonian view that the real world is almost entirely internal to the observer'. At the same time, Kissinger's hubris and hunger for control was beset by a corrosive anxiety: that, in an era of nuclear weapons proliferation and constant military modernisation, of geopolitical stalemate in Vietnam, and the emergence and militancy of new post-colonial states, order and mastery were harder to define and impose. He worried over the way 'military bipolarity' between the superpowers had 'encouraged political multipolarity', which 'does not guarantee stability. Rigidity is diminished, but so is manageability...equilibrium is difficult to achieve among states widely divergent in values, goals, expectations and previous experience' (emphasis added). He mourned that 'the greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order'. Here were the driving obsessions of the modern rational statesman based around a hunger for stasis and certainty that would entrench U.S. hegemony: For the two decades after 1945, our international activities were based on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in "emerging countries". This direct "operational" concept of international order has proved too simple. Political multipolarity makes it impossible to impose an American design. Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength will remain with the two superpowers. Kissinger's statement revealed that such cravings for order and certainty continually confront chaos, resistance and uncertainty: clay that won't be worked, flesh that will not yield, enemies that refuse to surrender. This is one of the most powerful lessons of the Indochina wars, which were to continue in a phenomenally destructive fashion for six years after Kissinger wrote these words. Yet as his sinister, Orwellian exhortation to 'evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world' demonstrated, Kissinger's hubris was undiminished. This is a vicious, historic irony: a desire to control nature, technology, society and human beings that is continually frustrated, but never abandoned or rethought.

#### Doesn’t it make sense, then, that the affirmative projects nations as threats, threats as insecure, and insecurity as a Divine Evil? Their recourse to Moloch is natural and inevitable—but only when we accept it as such. Rather than securitizing, take a step back—touch on the divinity of the world BEFORE the thought of threat; only accepting the terror of the Godless universe offers Being the chance to disclose upon us.

Mitchell 2005 (Andrew J. Mitchell, Stanford University, “Heidegger and Terrorism,” Research in Phenomenology, 35, 2005)

Heideggerian thinking is a thinking that thinks away from simple presence and absence. It thinks what Heidegger calls “the between” (das Zwischen). This between is a world of nonpresence and nonabsence. Annihilation is impossible for this world and so is security. The terror experienced today is a clue to the withdrawal of being. The world is denatured, drained of reality. Everything is threatened and the danger only ever increases. Dasein flees to a metaphysics of presence to escape the threatened world, hoping there to find security. But security cannot do away with the threat, rather it must guard it. Dasein guards the truth of being in the experience of terror. What is perhaps repugnant to consider in all this is that being calls for terrorism and for terrorists. With the enframing of being and the circulation of standing-reserve, what is has already been destroyed. Terrorism is merely the ugly confirmation of this point. As we have seen, being does not linger behind the scenes but is found in the staging itself. If being is to terrorize—if, in other words, this is an age of terrorism—then being must call for terrorists. They are simply more “slaves of the history of being” (GA 69: 209) and, in Heidegger’s eyes, no different from the politicians of the day in service to the cause of Americanism. But someone might object, the terrorists are murderers and the politicians are not. Granting this objection despite its obvious naïveté, we can nonetheless see that both politicians and terrorists are called for by the standing-reserve, the one to ensure its nonabsence, that the plan will reach everyone everywhere, and the other to ensure its nonpresence, that all beings will now be put into circulation by the threat of destruction. In this regard, “human resources” are no different from “livestock,” and with this, an evil worse than death has already taken place. Human resources do not die, they perish. Insofar as it is Americanism that is identified with technological domination and the spread of the unworld, then it is no wonder that America is the place where the question of terrorism can and must be posed. Instead of turning from terror, we are called to respond to it. Not by sealing ourselves off from it in a single-minded deafness, but by preserving the trace of being in its withdrawal. America is distinct in this because America most faces the challenge of Americanism. America is today fighting the shadow of itself, it yearns to leap over its shadow and into a state of pure visibility and security. America is not faced with an outside aggressor, but with its own photographic negative in Americanism/terrorism. America’s challenge is to not recognize itself in Americanism and to preserve its difference from this ogre. For America to believe that it is the driving force behind Americanism is for America to believe that it is in control of being. Americanism is a movement of being; it is nothing “American.” America’s other is neither Greece nor Rome, but Americanism. America must distinguish itself from Americanism in order to confront Americanism as its ownmost other. Terror can teach us this and lead us to preserve what is our own. Is this to say that we should remain forever terrorized? exist forever in a state of terror? Is this supposed to provide a solution to the problem of terrorism? Surely that would be an outrageous demand (arge Zumutung) to place upon thinking. The older man says the same thing about malevolence as a basic trait of being; it places an outrageous demand upon thinking. A first step away from the imposed convenience of Americanism might be heard in the words of the younger man, “That this should be easy, namely to think the essential, is also a demand which only arises from the spirit of devastation” (GA 77: 215). If we are to think the essential, to think what withdraws in concealment before the total availability of the unworld around us, then our thinking itself will have to change. Thinking the essential, this is a thinking that we can never be done with, a thinking that is never to be accomplished, a thinking that concerns what can never be thought through. Rather than think from out of the spirit of devastation, we are called to let it into thought; not to think devastation, but to devastatedly think. Thinking itself must be devastated and terrorized if we are to think today. Such a thinking would attend to the uncommon nature of our present situation before the terrorist threat. If America is terrorized, then it is terrorized by Americanism. But Americanism is nothing more than an epoch of being; it is the withholding of being in its withdrawal from us. In the face of this withdrawal we are called to think. Perhaps this is possible nowhere other than America; perhaps this thinking itself will mark another beginning for America, an American thinking that would not be enslaved to a pragmatic and utilitarian metaphysics. To think in this other American manner would be to entertain a new relation to technology, what Heidegger calls in the Spiegel interview of 1966 an “explicit relationship” to technology and “to what is happening today and what has been underway for three centuries.”24 Is such a thinking possible? Could it ever arise in America? Heidegger answers the question directly: SPIEGEL: This explicit relationship, do the Americans have it today? HEIDEGGER: They do not have it either. They are still entangled in a thinking, pragmatism, that fosters technological operating and manipulating but simultaneously blocks the path toward a contemplation of what is characteristic of modern technology. In the meantime, attempts to break away from pragmatic-positivistic thinking are being made here and there in the USA.25 There are no guarantees that these attempts will succeed; their success does not require such guarantees. We must hope that in the name of homeland security we do not too obstinately squelch them.

#### Our alternative is to sacrifice the Dead God Moloch to Being: Reject the affirmative as a way to interrupt the industrial metaphysics of technology.

#### Moving away from the affirmative’s metaphysics exposes the abyssal ground of Being—our poetic account of the universe escapes the technical control of modernity. Surrendering the myth of control solves.

Joronen 2011 (Mikko, Dept. of Geography, U. of Turku, Finland, “Dwelling in the Sites of Finitude: Resisting the Violence of the Metaphysical Globe,” Antipode, 0(0).)

In its most basic sense, the word Gelassenheit, the letting-be, refers to human “release” from the manipulative moulding of things, and thus, to the recognition and rejection of the rule of the prevailing ground of being, the power of machination (eg K¨aufer 2005:488; Zimmerman 1993:241). Through its letting-be the calculative power of machination, its one-track course of manipulative and ever-more-exploiting handling of nature (the “earth” of things), and ourselves, becomes simply rejected. Nevertheless, as Sch¨urmann (1978:16) reminds us, in German the “lassen” of Gelassenheit means only secondarily “to abandon”, “to reject” or “to ignore”, and primarily “to let” or “to let be”. Hence, it is not just the rejection and abandonment of the power of machination, but also letting-of-the-transformation-of-being into such “other beginning” where being unfolds as power-free, as a modality other than violence and power, and thus, where the earth is not forced under our orderings and calculations but rather where earth’s leading strings are followed. Our power-free letting-be thereby indicates a double sense, a doubleway of resisting: by rejecting the willfull power and by permissive letting of fundamental transformation based on abyssal being and self-emergence of things on earth. According to the first sense of rejecting, letting-be indicates a radical negation of the domain of the power of machination, a negation that interrupts its total and perfectly functioning unfolding (cf. Davis 2007:303). In its first sense, then, Gelassenheit means a leap that breaks open in the midst of the planetary power of machination through negation, by rejecting. It happens as a breaking open into the primordial freedom of abyssal being, into the openness prior to the freedoms and acts of a subject. Thus, this comportment of rejecting eventually brings out the abyssal groundlessness of being, which according to Heidegger works as an abundant reservoir that “grants us the possibility of dwelling [. . .] in a totally different way” (1966a:55). In its second sense, then, Gelassenheit intimates a possibility of a mode of being radically other than willing, a release from the grasp of limitless power- and profitseeking, a futural force of transformation that eventually offers what Heidegger calls the “other beginning” based on abyssal “time-spaceplay” of the Event of being (see Heidegger 1958:188, 2000:4, 60–61, 181, 2006:84–86).

#### And, assumptions about the truth of Being implicate all thought—read the plan as a call from the truth of Being itself, not as an ontologically neutral policy option—this is a prerequisite to any analysis.

Dillon 1999 (Michael, “The Scandal of the Refugee: Some Reflections on the ‘Inter’ of International Relations and Continental Thought," Pp. 97-99)

As Heidegger-himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political-never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other-regional-modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate through the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or aporia, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock-innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making.

#### Asking the question of Being uniquely outweighs human extinction, or even planetary annihilation: It is precisely this ability to displace the centrality of humanity or of ANY OTHER BEING in the act of questioning which gives ontology its terrifying existential power. It asks the very question of agency and praxis itself, and surrendering to the flow of Being recovers the presence of meaning which makes life valuable. Any calculation of physical annihilation is secondary.

Ziarek 2012 (Krzystof, Prof. Comparative Literature SUNY-Buffalo, “The Global Unworld: A Meditative Manifesto,” Impasses of the Post-Global: Theory in the Era of Climate Change, V2) CJQ

Such questions run parallel to the problem of the global unworld. But we could still ask why this turning of the world into a planetary unworld should be an issue at all: do we need the world, in the sense in which Heidegger thinks worlding, or can we just make do with the globe or the planet, assuming that we still might have a possibility of choice in the matter? And what kind of issue is this when we might be facing the global extinction of the human race or significant portions of it, or perhaps even most, if not all, forms of life on earth? While the question of the (un)world is not practical in any immediate sense, it is, I would argue, precisely the question of praxis in the elemental sense of who, as humans, we are and might be in the world, if the world is to world at all. Let’s remember that for Heidegger the question of our age is the question of being—not of humanity or animality, ecology or climate, though all these issues are implied and in fact critically implicated, that is, held open into deciding, in the kind of praxis that is at issue in Heidegger’s critique of power and technicity. Heidegger insists, and I am inclined to follow him in this respect, on the need and urgency of displacing the human from the position of centrality in our thinking and our discussions. What this means in terms of how one might think or at least begin to think in the context of the global unworld today is by thinking the complex relationality, which Heidegger calls das Ereignis or event (of propriation), a relationality which gives to be by way of a spatio-temporal play of beings in multiple relations between “earth” and “sky.” It means beginning from the always already finite event of the play of time-space rather than from the all temporal, albeit historical, pan-technicist view of experience as planetary, globally circumscribed, and interlinked, and dispose-able. For Heidegger, it means trying to let things or beings unfold in the while (Weile) and expanse (Weite) of their time-space rather than rushing to calculate and consume them in their technically disclosed availability. Heidegger’s questions are obviously not those of an economist or a market analyst, a politician or even a political theorist, of a climate scientist, a physicist, a genetic engineer, of a business or science ethicist. In what is certainly a deliberately provocative gesture, Heidegger asks if we can still think what it would mean if humanity survived the threatening catastrophes and continued as living beings but, in the process, allowed a forgetting of what being means and how humans are given to be as mortals. Commenting on the remarks which the American chemist Stanley made in 1955 in Lindau: “The hour is near when life will be placed in the hands of the chemist who will be able to synthesize, split, and change living substance at will,” Heidegger observes: “We marvel at the daring scientific research, without thinking about it. We do not stop to consider that an attack with the technological means is being prepared upon the life and essence [Wesen] of man compared with which the explosion of the hydrogen bomb means little. For precisely if the hydrogen bombs do not explode and human life on earth is preserved, an uncanny change in the world moves upon us” (Discourses 42). Over fifty years later we seem to be much nearer or maybe already at the point predicted by Stanley, with additional economic, military, and climactic complications attending the situation, and in this context Heidegger’s question sounds perhaps even more poignant. Certainly the questions Heidegger intimated in 1955 are being raised around us, but what is decisive, at least from the Heideggerian perspective, is precisely the perspective in which such questions are being raised and are allowed to resonate.

### 1NC - Anarchy

#### Their justification of energy production in totalizing apocalyptic terms drains energy from the workers who produce it. The machine saves lives at the expense of all livelihood.

The Invisible Committee ‘9 French anarcho-communist grad students, The Coming Insurrection, 2009, Semiotext(e) [http://libcom.org/files/thecominsur\_booklet[1].pdf](http://libcom.org/files/thecominsur_booklet%5b1%5d.pdf)

The order of work was the order of a world. The evidence of its ruin is paralyzing to those who dread what will come after. Today work is tied less to the economic necessity of producing goods than to the political necessity of producing producers and consumers, and of preserving by any means necessary the order of work. Producing oneself is becoming the dominant occupation of a society where production no longer has an object: like a carpenter who’s been evicted from his shop and in desperation sets about hammering and sawing himself. All these young people smiling for their job interviews, who have their teeth whitened to give them an edge, who go to nightclubs to boost the company spirit, who learn English to advance their careers, who get divorced or married to move up the ladder, who take courses in leadership or practice “self-improvement” in order to better “manage conflicts” – “the most intimate ‘self-improvement’”, says one guru, “will lead to increased emotional stability, to smoother and more open relationships, to sharper intellectual focus, and therefore to a better economic performance.” This swarming little crowd that waits impatiently to be hired while doing whatever it can to seem natural is the result of an attempt to rescue the order of work through an ethos of mobility. To be mobilized is to relate to work not as an activity but as a possibility. If the unemployed person removes his piercings, goes to the barber and keeps himself busy with “projects,” if he really works on his “employability,” as they say, it’s because this is how he demonstrates his mobility. Mobility is this slight detachment from the self, this minimal disconnection from what constitutes us, this condition of strangeness whereby the self can now be taken up as an object of work, and it now becomes possible to sell oneself rather than one’s labor power, to be remunerated not for what one does but for what one is, for our exquisite mastery of social codes, for our relational talents, for our smile and our way of presenting ourselves. This is the new standard of socialization. Mobility brings about a fusion of the two contradictory poles of work: here we participate in our own exploitation, and all participation is exploited. Ideally, you are yourself a little business, your own boss, your own product. Whether one is working or not, it’s a question of generating contacts, abilities, networking, in short: “human capital.” The planetary injunction to mobilize at the slightest pretext – cancer, “terrorism,” an earthquake, the homeless – sums up the reigning powers’ determination to maintain the reign of work beyond its physical disappearance. The present production apparatus is therefore, on the one hand, a gigantic machine for psychic and physical mobilization, for sucking the energy of humans that have become superfluous, and, on the other hand, it is a sorting machine that allocates survival to conformed subjectivities and rejects all “problem individuals,” all those who embody another use of life and, in this way, resist it. On the one hand, ghosts are brought to life, and on the other, the living are left to die. This is the properly political function of the contemporary production apparatus. To organize beyond and against work, to collectively desert the regime of mobility, to demonstrate the existence of a vitality and a discipline precisely in demobilization, is a crime for which a civilization on its knees is not about to forgive us. In fact, it’s the only way to survive it.

#### Alt text: embrace the coming insurrection. Immersing ourselves in catastrophe reclaims life from the control of the system.

The Invisible Committee ‘9 French anarcho-communist grad students, The Coming Insurrection, 2009, Semiotext(e) [http://libcom.org/files/thecominsur\_booklet[1].pdf](http://libcom.org/files/thecominsur_booklet%5b1%5d.pdf)

Everything about the environmentalist’s discourse must be turned upside-down. Where they talk of “catastrophes” to label the present system’s mismanagement of beings and things, we only see the catastrophe of its all too perfect operation. The greatest wave of famine ever known in the tropics (1876-1879) coincided with a global drought, but more significantly, it also coincided with the apogee of colonization. The destruction of the peasant’s world and of local alimentary practices meant the disappearance of the means for dealing with scarcity. More than the lack of water, it was the effect of the rapidly expanding colonial economy that littered the Tropics with millions of emaciated corpses. What presents itself everywhere as an ecological catastrophe has never stopped being, above all, the manifestation of a disastrous relationship to the world. Inhabiting a nowhere makes us vulnerable to the slightest jolt in the system, to the slightest climactic risk. As the latest tsunami approached and the tourists continued to frolic in the waves, the islands’ hunter-gatherers hastened to flee the coast, following the birds. Environmentalism’s present paradox is that under the pretext of saving the planet from desolation it merely saves the causes of its desolation. The normal functioning of the world usually serves to hide our state of truly catastrophic dispossession. What is called “catastrophe” is no more than the forced suspension of this state, one of those rare moments when we regain some sort of presence in the world. Let the petroleum reserves run out earlier than expected; let the international flows that regulate the tempo of the metropolis be interrupted, let us suffer some great social disruption and some great “return to savagery of the population,” a “planetary threat,” the “end of civilization!” Either way, any loss of control would be preferable to all the crisis management scenarios they envision. When this comes, the specialists in sustainable development won’t be the ones with the best advice. It’s within the malfunction and short-circuits of the system that we find the elements of a response whose logic would be to abolish the problems themselves. Among the signatory nations to the Kyoto Protocol, the only countries that have fulfilled their commitments, in spite of themselves, are the Ukraine and Romania. Guess why. The most advanced experimentation with “organic” agriculture on a global level has taken place since 1989 on the island of Cuba. Guess why. And it’s along the African highways, and nowhere else, that auto mechanics has been elevated to a form of popular art. Guess how. What makes the crisis desirable is that in the crisis the environment ceases to be the environment. We are forced to reestablish contact, albeit a potentially fatal one, with what’s there, to rediscover the rhythms of reality. What surrounds us is no longer a landscape, a panorama, a theater, but something to inhabit, something we need to come to terms with, something we can learn from. We won’t let ourselves be led astray by the one’s who’ve brought about the contents of the “catastrophe.” Where the managers platonically discuss among themselves how they might decrease emissions “without breaking the bank,” the only realistic option we can see is to “break the bank” as soon as possible and, in the meantime, take advantage of every collapse in the system to increase our own strength.

### 1NC Solvency

### 1NC Colonization

### 1NC Warming

#### They put the science of sustainability on an altar—this reinforces technocratic decision-making, resulting in serial policy and ontological failure which turns the case; interrogating ontology is crucial to sustainable living. OUR AUTHOR IS A FORMER PRACTICING NUCLEAR PHYSICIST.

Goeminne 2011 (Gert, Postdoctoral Fellow, Research Foundation—Flanders, Ghent University Center for Sustainability Studies, former nuclear physics PhD, “Once Upon a Time I was a Nuclear Physicist” Muse, Perspectives on Science, Vol 19 No. 1 2011)

. In my view, this problematic is deeply rooted in the metaphysical and ontological basis our Western society is built on and which also underlies the naïve realistic interpretation of science that resided in my nuclear laboratory (see Section 1): a frame of thought, in which subjectivity and objectivity are seen as mutually exclusive. Objectivity, on the one hand, is what science strives for; it is the realm in which truth is to be situated. Either our knowledge accurately represents reality—and it is true—or it does not, and is thus rejected. Subjectivity, on the other hand, relates to mere personal opinions (preferences, values, interests) and can never yield reliable knowledge. It is this strict ontological division between the nonhuman object and the human subject and its corresponding epistemology of represented facts and values (representationalism) that Latour has called the "Modern Constitution" (Latour 1993, pp. 13–15). The political order of the Modern Constitution now takes the form of an arena with two adversaries: the first one, called "science" and armed with powerful, but unconcerned facts taking all of the important decisions, and the other, called "politics," left with nothing but values, full of concern but quite powerless (Latour 1998, p. 104). The ideal of rational decision-making boils down to an ideal of irresponsibility: science dismisses politics of taking decisions. Science cuts politics short.

#### The myth of sustainability is a metaphysical construction that abstracts human ecology from any coherent ontological framework. This reintrenches the problems of technological politics, making environmental destruction inevitable.

Irwin 2008 (Ruth, Lecturer Phil. @ Univ. Auckland [New Zealand], "Heidegger, Politics and Climate Change: Risking it All," Pp. 180-81) CJQ

The global awareness of environmental issues has escalated steeply, since I began to write this book. It is wonderful to see awareness of the problem in the eyes of everybody we meet, even if the 'solutions' remain hard to achieve. The danger is that blind faith in technology combined with the discourse of 'sustainability' will sap all this good will, and direct it in ways that may have some short-term compensations, but will do nothing to reconsider the alienation of human beings from our natural ecology. Sustainability has taken on the mantra of market, efficiency, and economic development. It now enframes all aspects of planetary existence (humanity and nature) in a metaphysical synthesis. Economics, and more recently, sustainability, has been promoted beyond its competency, to a metaphysical status that explains all aspects of our world-view. We need not do away entirely with economics to redress this problem, but it does need reconceptualizing and repositioning as a minor field of surface transactions rather than a reiteration of Idealist conceptual mastery over nature that permeates our entire world-view. Exponential economic growth cannot be satisfactorily 'decoupled' from resource depletion and pollution. It is inextricably linked to consumerism. Exponential growth is a direct factor in producing the anthropogenic green-house gases that are contributing to climate change. Exponential economic growth is a key factor in modern politics. It is justified by the right and the left, by the market and the Keynesian Settlement. While the bulk of surplus value gets siphoned off towards the owners of production, a reliable 2 or 3 percent of 'surplus' goods gets redistributed among the workers, and this superficial improvement inhibits them from revolting against the alienation of modern capitalism (Keynes, 1936). The discourse of unfairness – as redistribution and equality – caught hold of Marxists and liberals alive and they missed the more profound point made by Marx about the alienation of 'Species Being' from nature (Marx, 1887). It is the alienation that is causing the crisis of climate change. Furthermore, Keynes institutionalization of low inflation (legislated by the Reserve Bank Act) makes exponential economic growth fundamental to the continued stability and structure of late capitalism. Exponential growth was not a problem when a couple hundred more bushels of corn were consumed from one year to the next. But it is an inescapable problem when the factor of exponential consumption has grown to millions of barrels of oil more per year. The mode of politics that is normative now is based on a complex and very long-standing history of philosophical ideas. Those ideas tend towards Idealism, reifying truth and ontology, or Being, to an abstract realm beyond time and space and separating the individual subject from the objects in their environment (Irwin, 2002). The result has been a tendency to see all things as objects. Idealism sets up items in the environment as flawed examples of universal categories and a reified form of 'pure' Idealist calculus (but not all forms of mathematics) has deepened, statistical and positivist science has become more and more variable to understand everything as aspects of a fixed metaphysical whole, that all serve the purpose of potential resource in the unfolding machinery of production and consumption.

#### Catastrophic warming inevitable—the idea that the plan can solve is a profound humanistic hubris.

Hamilton ’10 Clive Hamilton, Professor of Public Ethics in Australia, Requiem for a Species: Why We Resist the Truth About Climate Change, 2010, p. 27-28

The conclusion that, even if we act promptly and resolutely, the world is on a path to reach 650 ppm is almost too frightening to accept. That level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere will be associated with warming of about 4°C by the end of the century, well above the temperature associated with tipping points that would trigger further warming.58 So it seems that even with the most optimistic set of assumptions—the ending of deforestation, a halving of emissions associated with food production, global emissions peaking in 2020 and then falling by 3 per cent a year for a few decades—we have no chance of preventing emissions rising well above a number of critical tipping points that will spark uncontrollable climate change. The Earth's climate would enter a chaotic era lasting thousands of years before natural processes eventually establish some sort of equilibrium. Whether human beings would still be a force on the planet, or even survive, is a moot point. One thing seems certain: there will be far fewer of us. These conclusions arc alarming, co say the least, but they are not alarmist. Rather than choosing or interpreting numbers to make the situation appear worse than it could be, following Kevin Anderson and Alice Bows I have chosen numbers that err on the conservative side, which is to say numbers that reflect a more buoyant assessment of the possibilities. A more neutral assessment of how the global community is likely to respond would give an even bleaker assessment of our future. For example, the analysis excludes non-CO2, emissions from aviation and shipping. Including them makes the task significantly harder, particularly as aviation emissions have been growing rapidly and are expected to continue to do so as there is no foreseeable alternative to severely restricting the number of flights. And any realistic assessment of the prospects for international agreement would have global emissions peaking closer to 2030 rather than 2020. The last chance to reverse the trajectory of global emissions by 2020 was forfeited at the Copenhagen climate conference in December 2009. As a consequence, a global response proportionate to the problem was deferred for several years.